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RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS* ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL

Respondents urge that. m addition to the issues identified in Petitioners' Opening

lirief. there is anoiher issue before this Court: "Assuming that Ms, Molcr-l.ew is was a
"represent at h e' under Utah Rule of I \ idence 504(a)(4). were some or all of the

communications in\ oh ing her no! otherw ise "confidential" pursuant to Rule 5o4(alibi."

"I his issue was not raised below and therefore has nol been presened i'ov appeal. State ^
CM.. 2001 UT APP. 66,1| 9, 21 P.3d ONO. 0S3 (Utah App. 2001 ). However, in an
abundance of caution Appellants ha\e addressed that issue.

t\

RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' EACTUAL STATEMENT

1.

Appcllanls do nol dispute this slatement. hi 1 note thai il is nol found in the

Record on appeal.

2.

"I his stalemeni oi'"ftcf" is w holh invle\ ant to the issues on appeal.

Moreover, Appellants dispute that it was their counsel that sought ( ouil intervention.
The Record shows thai il was counsel for Respondenls who sought ('ourl intervention.
3.

Appellants do nol dispute this statement.

4.

Appellants do nol dispute that Mr. Moler testified substantially as set forth

in U is statement.

5.

.Appellants do not dispute thai Mr. Moler testified substantially as set forth

in this stalemeni

6.

Appcllanls do not dispute thai Mr. Moler testified substantially as set forth

in 11 lis statement

Ilow e\er. this statement is not rele\ an: lo the issues on appeal, and the

citation to the testimom does not include a Record citation.

/.

/

\ppcliants do not dispute this stalemeni

S.

Appellants do not dispute this statement.

9.

Appellants do not dispute this statement, h.a note (hat its e\ idenliarv

support is not found in the Record on appeal.

ARGUMENT

Respondents concede that the determinative Rule at issue in this appeal i> I tab
Rule of I wdence 504. Respondenls contend, however, that Appcllanls ha\e failed lo

c-aahhsh that YVenoh Moler-Lew is was a "rcpresentath e" o\' her parents for purposes of
that Rule because: <1I there is no reeoixl e\ idenee thai Ms. Moler-Lewis was "specificalh

authorized to communicate \\ ith the lawyer concerning a legal matter." (2) Ms. MolerI.ew is' in\ oh emenl in the litigation was nol "necessary" lo her parents" legal

representation, and (3) the Molers' claim thai Ms. Moler-Lew is is a "representative" o\'
her parents is an "after the fact" concoction that this t 'ourt should not countenance.
binalh. Respondents urge thai. e\ en if a prh ilege existed, it was waived when Mr. Moler
lestified about coin crsations w ith his daughter that predated (he existence of an attnnicv-

elie/n relationship. Lach of these arguments is either legally or factual!} inaccurate.
I.

UNDISPUTED RECORD EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT MS.
MOLER-LEWIS WAS A REPRESENTATIVE Ol HER PARENTS.

Petitioners' Opening Brief on Appeal argued in clear terms that Ms. Moler-Lew is
was a "represen lathe" of her parents because the undisputed facts established that she (a)
had "authority lo obtain professional legal scr\ ices" on her parents behalf, and (b) was

"specifiicalh authorized to communicate wiih the lawyer concerning a legal matter." See
Appcllanls' Opening Brief at 2. Nevertheless. Respondents argue that. "1 ooking at the
\ an ous subsections defining a "representative of a client." the only one to which the

Appcllanls point is the reference to 'ha\ing authority to obtain professional legal
services.'" Respondents1 Briel at LA

Appellants presented undisputed evidence lo the trial court, and lo this Court,
establishing thai Ms. Moler-I cwis had authority to. and did in lad, obtain legal .services
for her parents, and was authorized lo communicate with Strassberg & Lnsor concerning
the MolersMawsuil. (Moler A ff. ( R. 1I6s>)Vi .\ N: Moler-Lew is Aff. ( R. 1173-1174)
V N- 12.) 'hat e\ idenee was ne\ cr rebutted bv Defendants.

Lurlhermoic. Appcllanls argued and presented evidence

again undisputed

thai

Ms. Moler-Lew is was involved in meetings and coin crsalions between counsel and the

Molers. that she helped review pleadings before they were filed, and that she has
communicated with attorneys- in connection with the lawsuit. (Id. ^lj 12-13.) When
performing all these acts, Ms. Moler-Lew is was acting w ith the consent and know ledge
of her parents. (KM I2; Moler Alf. (R. MO))^ S.) Accordingly, the record below and

on appeal demonstrates clearly thai Ms. Moler-Lew is was a representative of her parents
as defined under Rule 504.

II.

THE PLAIN IANCUACE Ol Rl I E 504 DOES NOT RKQl'IRI THAI A
PERSONS PARTICIPATION IN HIE PRIYIEECE HE NECESSARY
I5EI ORE THAT PERSON MAY HE DEEMED A "REPRESEN 1 AHYE."

Although Respondenls repealedh posit that Ms. Moler-! ,eu is not a

"representative" of her parents because her participation was not "necessary" lo her
parents" representation, Respondents point to no language in Rule ^()4(a)(4) dial
establishes any such "necessity" requirement. As discussed in Appellants' Opening
hikf. this Court's decision in Hoffmani.w Conder, 712 P.2d 2lfi {Utah LLSS), is

inapposite. Thai case predated the adoption of the current Rule M)4 and did not address

the situation presented here: whether a designated representative of a partv is included
within the scope of the altornc} -client prh ilege.
Unable lo find a "neeessiiv" requirement in Rule 504(a)(4), or in anv ease decided
after that Rule was adopted. Respondents apparenth seek to bootstrap into the definition
of a "representative" the "reasonabh neeessarv" language in Rule of b videuce 504(a)(0).
I'hat Rule, however, does not address when a person is a •'representative" of a partv. but
rather defines when a communication is confidential. As discussed in Appellants'
()pernng Brief. Rule 504(a)(6) defines communications as confidential if the}' are "not
intended to be disclosed lo thud persons other than those to whom diselosure is in
furtherance of the rendition ofprofessional legal services to the client or those
reasonabh uecessarv for the transmission of the communication." ( bmphasis added.)
I lerc. the ev idence of record establishes that the coinmunications belw een and among the
Molers. then' counsel, and Ms. Moler-Lew is w ere "in furtherance of the rendition of

professional legal services to the client." and were therefore confidential. (R. 11Ai,
I 1~4). f.ven if. as Respondents urge, the communications were merely out o\
coin enience rather than necessitv. ihere is no ev idence to suggest that tho.se

communications were not made to further the Molers" legal representation.
Respondenls also seem lo argue that Ms. Moler-Lewis cannot be considered a
representath e of her parents because she did not participate in civ/t attorney-client
communication. (Sec Respondents1 Brief at 14.) Nothing in Rule 504 requires thai a

representath e attend everv attornev -client meeting, lest the representath e lo>e thai status.

binallv. Respondents argue that the pnv ilege does not apply lo communications
between Ms. Moler-Lewis and her parents in wInch the advice of Appellants' counsel
was discussed. I low ever, the plain language of Rule 564(b) extends ihe pnv ilege to
communications "between the client and the clienAs representatives, law vers, lawyer's
representatives ... and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's
representath es ... /'// any comhitiiition." In other words. not surprisinglv, con\ ersalions
about the legal representation that occur between the die it and the client's representative

are privileged whether or not an attorney is present.
III.

RESPONDENTS' ARCIMENT THAT THE APPOINTMENT Ol
MOI Ek-EI WIS AS A REPRESENTATIVE WAS AN M

II R

MS.

I HE

I A( T" (ONCOI ION IS A RED HERRING.

Respondents contend (hat Appellants" appointment of their daughter as their

representative vv as an "after the lad" designation thai defies the purpose of Rule 564.

1his argument is a red herring. Respondenls ncur identify the point in lime thai
Appellants' appointment of their rcprcsenlalive was purporledlv "after.1' The imdispuled
lads ol record demonstrate that Ms. Moler-1 cw is vv as authorized bv her parents lo speak
with counsel on their behalf from the very outset of thi.s litigation. In fact, the vei v fusl

conversation wilh Strassberg <x: Elisor about this case occurred between Mr. Strassberg
and Ms. Moler-I ewis. (R. I 174), Moreover, Ms. Molerd.ew is allendcd and participated
in the first meeting between Mr. Strassberg and .Appcllanls (R. II 74. I I66).

Accordingly, Appellants' appointment of their daughter as their rcprcsenlalive predated
whatever undefined point in time Respondents believe is the litmus test for the timclv
appointment of a icpresentalivc.

IV.

TESTIMONY ABOUT CON\ ERSATIONS PREDA I INC. THE
EXISTENCE Ol AN ATTORNEY-CEIENT REI ATIONSIIIP DOES NOT
W'AIVE THE PRIX III (,E.

Although Respondents urge that there is "no logical basis" on which lo

"distinguish] ] communications occurring before, as opposed to after, the retention of
counsel." the distinguishing basis is logical and obv ions. Il is axiomatic that no attornevclient privilege can exist unless and until an attorney-chenl rclatmnship is created. Mere,
it is undisputed that no such relationship came into existence until then end of 2oos.
IR. 11~5-~4). I fence, when Mr. Moler testified about conversations w ith his daughter
that occurred before the Molers retained counsel, he was nol and could nol possibh have
been disclosing anv privileged matter, Accordinglv. no waiver occurred.
CONCESSION

This Court has noted that the purpose o{' the attorney-client pnv ilege is "to
encourage candor between allorne} and client and promote the best possible
representation of the client." Cold Standard. Inc. v. American liarnck Resources (I;SA).
inc.. Sol I'.2d s>06, 61 1 (Utah 1660). The extension of the privilege to representatives of
the client acknow ledged that the promotion of "the best possible representation ol ihe

client" can be served by allow ing someone other than the attorney and the client to
participate in the legal representation. The undisputed facts in this case establish that
W'endv Moler-Lewis was appointed as her parents' representath e so that she could help

her parents receive "the best possible representation." Accordinglv. for the foregoing
reasons, and those set forth in Appellants' opening brief on appeal. Appellants

rcspectfulh request that this ('ourt REVERSE the trial court's order granting Defendants'
motion to compel.
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